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TRADING SUBSTANTIVE VALUES FOR PROCEDURAL VALUES:
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION

IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF

1967*

Gilmer v. Interstate JohnsonLane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
When hired by Respondent, Petitioner was required to register
with the New York Stock Exchange.1 The New York Stock Exchange
compelled Petitioner to agree to arbitration of any controversy arising
between himself and Respondent with regard to employment or termination of employment. 2 Pursuant to being fired at age 62, 3 Petitioner

filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), 4 followed by a suit in federal court.5 Petitioner
alleged that he was fired because of his age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 6 Respondent
moved to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim.7 The District Court
denied respondent's motion on the basis that ADEA claimants have

* Editor's Note: This comment received the Huber Hurst Award for the outstanding case
comment submitted in the Spring 1992 semester.
1. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). Petitioner was hired
by respondent as Manager of Financial Services in May 1981. Id. at 1650.
2. Id. at 1650. In signing the arbitration agreement, Gilmer "agreed to arbitrate any dispute,
claim or controversy" arising between him and Interstate as required by the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) rules. Id. Of relevance here, the NYSE rules required arbitration of "any
controversy between a registered representative and any member organization arising out of
employment or termination of employment of such registered representative." Id. at 1651.
3. Id.
4. Id. Before a claimant can file suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
he must file an age discrimination charge with the EEOC and wait at least 60 days. Id. The
EEOC must attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice and effect voluntary compliance
with the ADEA through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §626(b) (1992). If the EEOC decides to bring
action against the employer in federal court, the employee's right to sue is extinguished. Gilmer,
111 S. Ct. at 1653.
5. Id. at 1653. Petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina pursuant to the ADEA. Id. at 1651.
6. Id. at 1652. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(1)
(1992) makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." Id.
7. Id. at 1651. Respondent based his motion to compel on the grounds that the arbitration
agreement contained in the registration agreement compelled arbitration of the ADEA claim
because the claim arose out of Respondent's termination. Id.
343
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a right to a judicial forum.8 Reversing the District Court, the Court
of Appeals held that it could find no reason to declare the arbitration
agreement unenforceable in the context of ADEA claims. 9 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to directly address the ability
to arbitrate ADEA claims and HELD, an ADEA claim can be subjected to compulsory arbitration. 10
The judicial attitude toward arbitration in general has been undergoing a radical shift from judicial hostility to judicial support. The
seminal case addressing the ability to arbitrate statutory claims in the
context of employment discrimination was Alexander v. GardnerDenver.,, In Alexander, Plaintiff, a black man, was fired after three
years on the job. 12 After unsuccessfully contesting his termination in
an arbitration hearing, 13 he submitted a discrimination claim to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission14 and filed suit in federal
court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 5
Although the case was dismissed in the lower courts, 6 the United
States Supreme Court held that an employee's statutory right to a
trial de novo under Title VII is not foreclosed pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement. ' 7 Because the text of Title VII did not directly

8. Id. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina based
its decision on the precedent set by Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974),
wherein the Court stated that "Congress intended to protect ADEA claimants from the waiver
of a judicial forum." Id.
9. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 115. The United States Court of Appeals for the'Fourth Circuit
found "nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying congressional intent to preclude
enforcement of arbitration agreements." Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 36.
12. Id. at 38. Petitioner was hired by respondent to perform maintenance work at respondent's plant. The year before he was fired, he was promoted to a trainee position as a drill
operator. Respondent claimed that petitioner was fired because he was producing too many
defective or unusable parts that had to be thrown away. Id.
13. Id. at 39. Petitioner filed a grievance stating he felt he had been unjustly fired. Id.
This grievance was filed pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement in force between the
company and petitioner's union. Id. The arbitrator found petitioner had been fired for cause.
Id. at 42.
14. Id. Initially, petitioner filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which
referred the complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. at 43.
15. Id. at 44. The purposes of Title VII are to assure equality of employment opportunities
by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Id.
16. Id. The District Courts and Court of Appeals held that petitioner was bound by the
prior arbitral decision and had no right to sue under Title VII. Id.
17. Id. at 36.

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

address the role of arbitration with respect to Title VII claims,ls the
Court based its ruling on consideration of the completeness of the
procedures for enforcement of Title VII 19 and the inability of arbitration to properly address the purposes of Title VII.2° In essence, the
Court suggested that arbitration is not the appropriate forum to resolve statutory claims that involve employment discrimination.21
A decade after Alexander, however, the Supreme Court began to
look more favorably upon arbitration of statutory claims.2 Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon2 marked the Court's most forceful ruling by establishing a rebuttable presumption2 that arbitration
agreements will be upheld with respect to statutory claims in the
commercial context.- In McMahon, Plaintiffs brought claims in federal
court against their brokers (Defendants), alleging violations of antifraud provisions in §10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(SEC) and of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). 26 Defendants moved to compel arbitration, relying on customer agreements2 which provided for arbitration of any claims cus-

18. Id. at 47. Title VII provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in
several forums. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 49; see supra note 16.
21. Michael Lieberman, Overcoming the Presumption of Arbitrability of ADEA Claims:
The Triumph of Substantive Over ProceduralValues in Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1817 (1990). Alexander reached its conclusions without relying upon the fact that
the arbitration agreement in question was pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. In so
doing, it forcefully suggested that the displacement of the judicial forum by arbitration of
discrimination claims is inappropriate. Id. at 1833.
22. Comment, Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 104 HARV. L. REV. 568 (1990). When the Court decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (an antitrust dispute brought under the
Sherman Act was subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement), it
reversed a previous trend of judicial hostility toward arbitration in which courts often refused
to enforce agreements to arbitrate statutory claims on public policy grounds. Id.
23. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
24. Id. at 226. This presumption can be rebutted only if 1) Congress expressed its intent
to prohibit a waiver of the judicial forum in the text of the statute or legislative history reveals
such intent or 2) there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying
purpose. Id.
25. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1826.
26. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220. Petitioners also brought claims for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty. Id.
27. Id. at 223. The arbitration agreement read "Unless unenforceable due to federal or
state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you
for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration ....
" Id.
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tomers may have regarding their accounts.2 The district court found
that the SEC claims were arbitrable and the RICO claims were not.2
The Court of Appeals reversed the SEC claim and affirmed the RICO
claimso The Supreme Court found that both the SEC and RICO claims
were subject to compulsory arbitration. 31 The Court reasoned that by
going through arbitration, the claimants, instead of sacrificing substantive rights afforded by the statute, merely agreed to resolve their
disputes in an arbitral setting rather than a judicial setting.3 2 Embracing a new confidence in the arbitral forum, the Court established the
presumption that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims will be
enforced. 3
Case law addressing the ability to arbitrate statutory claims has
thus followed two distinct routes. Alexander and its progeny4 have
refused to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement
when the claim asserted involves employment discrimination protected
by a federal statute. 5 McMahon and its progeny6 have established
the presumption that statutory claims can be subject to compulsory
arbitration in a commercial context. 37 The Third District Court of
Appeals, in Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc.,3 was the first
appellate court to reconcile these divergent lines of cases.39 Nicholson

28.

Id.

29. Id. at 224. The District Court found the §10(b) claims arbitrable under the agreement
stressing the "strong national policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements." Id.
However, the RICO claims were not arbitrable because of the "important federal policies inherent
in the enforcement of RICO by the federal courts." Id.
30. Id. at 224. The Court of Appeals reasoned that previous case law (which has since been
overruled) held that claims raised under §10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act are not
arbitrable and public policy considerations make it inappropriate to arbitrate RICO claims. Id.
31.

Id.

32. Id. at 229 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
33. See Comment, supra note 22, at 571 (describing the McMahon presumption and ground
for rebuttal).
34. See generally Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981)
and McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding that arbitration of employment discrimination claims pursuant to arbitration agreements is inappropriate). Id.
35. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36 (holding that the arbitral forum was not appropriate for
a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII). Id.
36. See generally Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (reiterating the Courts strong current endorsement of the federal statutes favoring arbitration and explicitly overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which had held that
arbitration of securities statutes was not allowed). Id.
37. Id.; Shearson American/Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
38. Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989).
39.

Id.
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addressed whether an age discrimination claim based on a federal
statute could be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration agreement. 40 The Nicholson court concluded that judicial
fora should be reserved for age discrimination cases, which should
be
41
contexts.
commercial
in
arising
cases
from
differently
treated
In Nicholson, the Plaintiff had been working for the Defendant
for 27 years 42 when he was fired. 43 One year before he was fired, the
Plaintiff signed a contract" wherein he agreed to arbitrate any grievances he might have regarding his termination. 45 When Plaintiff was
fired, he filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC and initiated a lawsuit raising claims under the ADEA.4 6 The District Court
47
denied Defendant's motion to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim.
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
adopted the reasoning used in Alexander, affirmed the district court's
decision, and refused to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs ADEA claim.48
Nicholson stands for the proposition that some statutory rights
are important not only to the parties involved, but also to the public
at large. 49 Statutes that protect workers from discrimination in the
workplace embody crucial substantive rights. - In such a case, a conflict
develops between the purposes of the statute and arbitration procedures.51 In reconciling Alexander and McMahon, the District Court
preserved the minimal substantive rights afforded an individual under

40. Id. at 222.
41. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1820.
42. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 222. Plaintiff was hired by defendant as an attorney in 1957.
Id. After years of promotions, he was appointed Vice-President for Corporate Financial Services
in 1981. Id.
43. Id. at 223. Defendant told plaintiff he was fired due to corporate restructuring. Id.
44. Id. at 222. The arbitration clause in plaintiff's contract read, "Any dispute or controversy
arising under or in connection with this Agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration
.... 11Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 223.
47. Id. The district court reasoned that the text and legislative history of the ADEA
demonstrated that Congress intended that ADEA claims be nonarbitrable. Id.
48. Id. at 224.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 227. See Comment, supra note 22, at 570 (stating that some statutory rights are
important not only to the parties involved in the dispute, but also to the public at large and
should be reserved to the courts).
51. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1821 (expressing that when disputes involve core public
concerns or unequal bargaining power, they are inappropriate for arbitration).
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the ADEA rather than trading these rights for a national policy of
procedure advocating that all statutory claims can be proper subjects
for arbitration.52
In the instant case,- the Supreme Court addressed the issue raised
in Nicholson,- thereby subjecting the issue of the ability to arbitrate
ADEA claims to final resolution.- However, rather than directly addressing the Nicholson opinion, the instant court merely acknowledged
the opinion in a footnote.' Furthermore, the instant court dismissed
the Alexander prohibition against arbitration of employment discrimination claims as not controlling. 57 Instead, the instant court adopted
the reasoning of McMahon,, which dealt with arbitration in a commercial context, and eagerly extended the presumption of arbitrability to59
reach employment discrimination claims pursuant to the ADEA.
Using the McMahon test, the instant court ultimately decided the
ability to arbitrate ADEA claims on the basis of whether there was
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the underlying purposes
of the ADEA.6
The goals of the ADEA 61 are to prevent and eliminate age discrimination in employment and to compensate its victims.6 2 The instant
court did not address the conclusions of Alexander and Nicholson
courts, which found that only the judicial forum was adequate to
vindicate claims of age discrimination in employment thereby furthering these goals.63 Instead, the instant court adopted McMahon's con-

52. See generally Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1822 (asserting that if discrimination claims
were presumed nonarbitrable, this would allow substantive public values, such as nondiscrimination, to prevail over procedural values, such as arbitration).
53. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
54. Id. at 1650. The issue addressed was "whether a claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)... can be subjected to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement in a securities registration application." Id.
55. Id. at 1651.
56. Id. at 1651 n.1.
57. Id. at 1656.
58. See generally Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652 (citing the McMahon test for arbitrability). Id.
59. Id. at 1657.
60. Id. at 1652.

61. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1992).
62. Id. The goals of the ADEA are "to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1992).
63. Supra note 21; supra note 18.
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fidence in arbitration and rejected the argument that arbitration would
undermine the role of the EEOC in effectively promoting ADEA's
goals.The instant court found that all further challenges to the adequacy
deserved only brief discussion because these challenges
arbitration
of
were sufficiently addressed and resolved in McMahon and its prog67
eny. 5 The potential bias of the arbitrator,- limited discovery tools,
and unequal bargaining power s were not a concern to the instant
court because these issues had already been resolved by a series of
cases that dealt with them in the commercial context. 69 The instant
court did not address the reasoning in Alexander, which advocated
that these issues should be considered differently when they are faced
in an employment discrimination context.7- Instead, the instant court
found that in the wake of McMahon and its progeny, age discrimination
71
in employment claims can be subject to compulsory arbitration.
The instant court underestimates the impact of its decision on the
ability of the EEOC to act effectively to protect elderly employees
from discrimination in the workplace. 7When the judicial forum is
displaced for the arbitral forum, it is unlikely that claimants will file
a charge with the EEOC when their dispute is being handled by an
arbitrator. 73 The instant court points out that the EEOC has independent authority to pursue any suspicion it might have of employment
discrimination 74 and that charges by employees are not the only way
they find out about discrimination. 75 However, the reality is that the
EEOC has limited resources and does not exercise its independent

64.

Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653.

65.

Id. at 1654.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
comparable
69. Id.
70.

(addressing protections against bias).
(discussing why the court dismisses limited discovery as not important).
at 1655-56 (explaining why unequal bargaining power in employment context is
to that in an arms-length transaction).
at 1654.

See id.

71. Id. at 1657. The Supreme Court held that Gilmer had not met his burden of showing
that Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that
Act. Id.
72. Compare with Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227 (speculating that any procedure that detracts
from the EEOC charge requirement would undermine Congress' design).
73. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1647. Displacing the judicial forum in favor of arbitration
for discrimination claims may discourage claimants from filing a charge with the EEOC, thus
undermining the purposes of the ADEA. Id.
74. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

investigatory powers very often. 76 The charges by individual employees
are the most effective means of identifying an employer that is dis-77
criminating and to take appropriate action to stop the discrimination.
The statutory scheme ensures the filing of charges because filing
charges is a prerequisite to bringing a federal suit.18 When individuals
stop filing charges with the EEOC because their disputes are being
settled outside the judicial forum, the ADEA's ability to stop discrimination in employment is severely impaired and the public's substantive
rights are compromised.- 9
Faced with a case involving the ability to arbitrate an ADEA claim,
the instant court chooses to rely upon case law that dealt with the
arbitration of statutory claims involving commercial disputes rather
than following the established precedent presented in case law dealing
with employment discrimination under Title VII and ADEA.8 0 The
instant case stands for the proposition that statutory claims that arise
in the employment discrimination context are equally as capable of
being properly vindicated in the arbitral setting as those that arise
in a commercial context. 81 However, the instant court ignores the
analysis of Alexander, which strongly supports the proposition that
Congress did not intend for employment agreements to preclude access
to the judicial forum. 2
Rather than presume all statutes to be proper subjects for arbitration, the instant court should recognize that employment discrimination
statutes provide minimum substantive rights which apply to all persons, not just those involved in the immediate dispute.- As such,

75. Id.
76. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Comment, supra note 22, at 573. An arbitration agreement removes the possibility of
a private lawsuit, thereby eliminating the incentive to file with the EEOC and denying the
agency its independent right to discover and process age discrimination cases. Id.
80. See generally Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1647 (choosing to follow Mitsubishi and progeny
rather than Alexander and progeny).
81. Id.
82. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1851. The analysis of Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36, lends
strong support for the proposition that Congress did not intend federal judicial proceedings in
discrimination cases to be preempted by enforceable employment arbitration agreements. Id.
83. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1831, 1851. The Court noted the importance of the private
right of action in the enforcement of Title VII, stating that 'the private litigant not only
redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 1831. "Certain statutes which provide minimum substantive
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claims under these statutes can be properly addressed only in a judicial
setting, not an arbitral setting.84 Furthermore, all statutes dealing
with elimination of discrimination in employment should be interpreted
consistently with one another because they have similar goals founded
on similar public policy grounds s5 To treat one protected class differently from another may evoke the public sentiment that one class
deserves more protection than another. Here, because Title VII claimants are protected from having their judicial forum precluded pursuant
to an arbitration agreement, older people might feel that Congress
has granted more protection through Title VII to racial minorities and
women than they have been granted through the ADEA against
exactly the same conduct, employment discrimination. Furthermore,
by removing employment discrimination claims from a public to a
private sector, the instant court has indicated that age discrimination
in employment is no longer a public concern sThe instant court quickly dismisses the challenges to the adequacy
of arbitration as a reflection of the past distrust of arbitration which
the Supreme Court has since abandoned. s7 Furthermore, the instant
court reasons that since these issues were settled in the commercial
context of McMahon, they need not be addressed in the employment
discrimination context. The court ignores the fact that legislation
addressing discrimination has often been viewed differently than legislation addressed in purely economic disputes2 9
The instant case fails to recognize that the inadequacies of arbitration can be seriously disadvantageous to an ADEA claimant. ° Although not a concern when dealing with arbitration of a commercial
statutory claim, the potential bias of the arbitrator should be a particu-

guarantees . . . are to be treated differently for arbitration purposes." Id. at 1851 (citing
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36).
84. Id.
85. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1834. The public law concepts the Court identified in
Alexander to support its holding that the judicial forum for Title VII claims is not subject to
displacement logically extends to all discrimination statutes. Id. Discrimination statutes should
be interpreted consistently to preserve access to the judicial forum for those the statute is
trying to protect. Id. at 1839.
86. Comment, supra note 22, at 584. "Removing the entire field of ADEA law from the
public eye may send a message that age discrimination is no longer a public issue." Id.
87. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1654.
88. Id.
89. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1851 (noting that "discrimination and civil rights legislation
have traditionally been viewed differently than purely private economic disputes").
90. See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 221.
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lar concern in an employment discrimination dispute. 91 Because the
arbitration need be familiar only with the law of the shop, not the
law of the land,9 it is likely that the arbitrator will be involved in
business and thus harbor subconscious prejudices against the employee. Furthermore, discrimination can be subtle, and proving discrimination can be very difficult.9 The limited discovery tools permitted
9
by arbitration can make it nearly impossible to prove discrimination. "
Moreover, the court barely acknowledges the unequal bargaining
power issue. 95 The realities of the workplace are that new employees
desperate for employment and older employees who have invested
many years in their career may lack any real option to refuse to sign
arbitration agreements.- As a result of the instant case, employers
may use this superior bargaining power to induce employees to sign
arbitration agreements, thereby displacing enforcement of ADEA
claims from the federal courts to arbitration- and thereby cutting
down their costs for resolving disputes with terminated employees.This imbalance of bargaining power is much greater than that found
in the arms-length transactions disputed in McMahon and its progeny . 9 Thus, the inadequacies of arbitration that were found to be
inconsequential in commercial contexts are crucial to protecting the
claimant's rights in the employment discrimination context and deserved more consideration by the instant court. 1°0
With its decision, the instant court expands the presumption of
arbitrability to cover statutory claims involving employment discrimi-

91. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57.
92. Id.
93. Comment, supra note 22, at 584. In discussing the discovery process, the article asserts
that the broader discovery allowed in federal courts might be critical because "age discrimination
is often of a peculiarly subtle character and this fact... may complicate the proof and require
deeper probing than usual." Id.
94. Id.
95. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1661 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229.
97. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1852 (speculating as to shift of enforcement of ADEA
away from the federal courts).
98. Comment, supra note 22, at 584 (identifying arbitration as quick and less costly than
a federal suit).
99. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1844. The Nicholson court suggested that the disparity
of bargaining power between employers and employees generally, and between employers and
older employees specifically, discredited the argument that arbitration provisions in individual
employment contracts were comparable to those found in an arm's length commercial contract.
Id.
100. See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 221.
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nation. 1°1 It moves the enforcement of the ADEA from the public
sector into the private. °0In so doing, it sends a message to the public
that discrimination against the elderly in the workplace is no longer
a public concern.1 ° The instant court places more value on establishing
a policy of consistent procedure than on examining the impact of its
decision on the future of discrimination in general.104 In essence, the
instant court trades the substantive rights of employees for procedural
rights in general.
Karen Kulatz

101. Lieberman, supra note 21, at 1817. The Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
arbitrability of private arbitration agreements, creating a general presumption of arbitrability
and circumscribing the possibilities for rebutting this presumption. Id.
102. Comment, supra note 22, at 584.
103. Id.
104. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1647.

